Squeaky Clean Hearts and Teeth

The pivot point of today’s reflection is going to be squeaky clean hair (point 1) and “you can tell it’s working by the tingle” toothpaste (point 2).  After that, all bets are off but this might be the time to admit that I am feeling just a little snarky as I write this.

I remember hearing about “squeaky clean” hair from the time I was old enough to see ads in magazines.  All the derivative kinds of “squeaky clean”—politicians, Mormons (I know those are overlapping categories this year), boy scouts, librarians, etc.—are built on the metaphor of the hair.  This is what I remember.

Then I ran across this.  “In reality, that squeak is a cry for help: hair that squeaks signifies bad clean; it can mean that it has been over-cleaned, stripped of natural oils, and just plain damaged.”  Or, the way I heard it first, “That ‘squeak’ is your hair screaming for the oils you just stole from it.”

So hair is “squeaking.”  Or it is “screaming?”  Not quite the same.  The squeaking/screaming distinction has been dear to the makers of “mild shampoos,” which “do not wash the good out with the bad,” and to makers of conditioners, which restore the good after you have stripped it out.  The great thing about strong shampoos is that you pay to strip all the natural oils out and then you need to pay for a conditioner to put them all back in.

Then I ran into this in Charlie Duhigg’s  The Power of Habit: Why We Do What We Do in Life and Business.

Unlike other toothpastes of that period, Pepsodent contained citric acid, as well as doses of mint oil and other chemicals that at the time were relatively exotic in consumer goods.  Pepsodent’s inventor had used those ingredients to make his toothpaste taste minty and to make sure the paste wouldn’t become gluey as it sat on the shelves.  But those chemicals had another, unanticipated effect as well: They’re irritants that create a tingling sensation on the tongue and gums.

It’s clear from this account that the mint oil and the citric acid do nothing at all to clean your teeth.  What they do is irritate your tongue and gums.  Is this irritation a good thing?  Is it something you would pay extra money for?  Yes, it is, it turns out, because the irritation is called “tingling” and the tingling has a meaning—it means your teeth are clean.  In fact, people soon came to feel that the tingling—the indicator light—meant that the teeth were clean and that your teeth were not clean unless you felt the tingling.

Here’s Duhigg again.

 When researchers at competing companies started interviewing customers, they found that people said that if they forgot to use Pepsodent, they realized their mistake because they missed that cool, tingling sensation in their mouths.  They expected—they craved—that slight irritation.  If it wasn’t there, their mouths didn’t feel clean.

I don’t care one way or the other about the toothpaste, actually, but I am fascinated by how powerful this indicator light is.  Remember that the citric acid and the mint oil don’t do anything for your teeth and nothing valuable for your tongue and your gums.  Their only function is to give you a sensation, the meaning of which was marketed just like the toothpaste.  The meaning is that the toothpaste is still working; your teeth are still clean.  And, of course, just as important: without that assurance that your teeth are clean, they aren’t really “clean.”  The product (the toothpaste) and the irritant (the oils and acids) and the assurance of meaning all come in the same package and the fact that only the second two are related to each other at all doesn’t seem to matter.

So let’s give up on the toothpaste and get to something really important.  Let’s talk about “doing the right thing.”  What we need, clearly, is an indicator light—like the irritation—which tells you that you did the right thing.  For the purposes of this reflection, it doesn’t matter in the slightest what “the right thing” is.  Irritation already means clean teeth, so how about warmth? 

When you do the right thing, your body temperature goes up two degrees and your cheeks “burn” (as we say). That burn is the indicator light.  When your cheeks burn, you know you are doing the right thing.  You could call it “an inner warmth” if you wanted.  Now this is not a neutral indicator, like thumbs up or down from the judges.  No, this is ardently desired.  When you don’t have this inner warmth, how do you really know you did the right thing?  It is the inner warmth that tells you that you did the right thing.  If you don’t have that warmth, maybe you didn’t do the right thing.

Notice that the value, the “goodness” of the action, is now the same thing as the indicator.  It isn’t that you know you did something wrong when the inner warmth isn’t there.  There isn’t an “inner coldness” that shows up when you have done something wrong.  It’s that you don’t KNOW you did something right without the inner warmth.  You find yourself putting your hand on your cheek now and then, just to make sure it is still warmer than it would be “naturally.”

Now that would work.  Back in the old days, you had to do an action out of a pure or benevolent motive or it had to have beneficial effects on people.  There are rewards there, certainly, but not enough to maintain them consistently.  What we need is the inner warmth as an indicator.  That’s how you know for sure.  Keeping that inner warmth going is ardently to be desired, not, you will recall, because there is anything good about it, but because it is the constant presence of an indicator of virtue.

It’s great.  It’s just like the teeth.  The inner warmth doesn’t have to do anything for your soul, just as the irritation doesn’t have to do anything for your teeth.  The irritation tells you “it’s working.”  The warmth tells you “you done good.”

Inner warmth.  “Don’t leave home without it.”  Or, “Are you really sure you did the right thing?”

 

Posted in Living My Life, ways of knowing | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

What deciding to love can do

In 2001, Director Ron Howard made a movie about the perilous career of John Nash, who won the 1994 Nobel Prize for economics.  Nash’s life, as portrayed by the movie, is pretty dark and I have heard that his actual life was even darker.  I have heard that his marriage to Alicia was not as stirringly redemptive as the story is told in the movie.  It is also entirely possible that the actual John Nash was not as photogenic as Russell Crowe, who played him in the movie, and that Alicia Nash was not as photogenic as Jennifer Connelly.

I don’t care.

I want to think today about their relationship as it is portrayed in the movie, which is all I actually know about it.  I want to begin with a few lines that Nash included in his acceptance speech in Stockholm.  He said, speaking to Alicia as though she were the only person in the audience, “I am only here tonight because of you.  You are the reason I am.”

I’d like to puzzle a little today about how that was true.  To my mind, John and Alicia Nash are heroes.  Each of them made the very very hard choice about what to do.  It isn’t hard, is it, to imagine what it costs to do the hard thing; to take the redemptive action when only your decision to do so is supporting you?  Look around your own life.  Such occasions are not hard to find.  However different—however less daunting—the circumstances are from those the Nashes faced, the choice to do the hard thing, which often enough is the right thing, is the choice that faces us all.

One day, their friend Sol asked Alicia Nash how she was doing, given John’s illness.  She began by telling him about John’s symptoms.  “No,” said Sol, “How are you?”  Here’s what she said.

I think often what I feel is obligation…or guilt over wanting to leave.  Rage…against John, against God…and…  But then I look at him and I force myself to see the man I married.  And he becomes that man.  He is transformed into someone that I love and I am transformed into someone who loves him.  It’s not all the time, but it’s enough.

A few scenes later, Thomas King, on behalf of the Nobel Committee, tells John that he is being considered for a Nobel prize.  He has been sent to make an assessment of Nash, to see whether, if the prize were granted him, he would embarrass the Committee in his acceptance of it.  Here’s what he said.

Would I embarrass you?  Yes, it is possible.  You see, I am crazy. I take the newer medications, but I still see things that are not here.  I just choose not to acknowledge them.  Like a diet of the mind, I choose not to indulge certain appetites, like my appetite for patterns; perhaps my appetite to imagine and to dream.

Nash was a paranoid schizophrenic.  He saw patterns which were, in the delusional world he entered from time to time, the basis of his heroic service to the U. S. intelligence community. Spymaster Ed Harris is shown here in the middle of one of Nash’s fantasies.  Nash’s ability to see patterns no one else could see were at the heart of who he was and very probably contributed in a major way to his recognized work as a mathematician and economic theoretician.  “Not indulging” that appetite involved renouncing his core strength.  And he didn’t have to do it just once.  He had to do it every day.  He chose, every day, to refuse to acknowledge a substantial part of the life he saw around him.  And these people whose reality he now denied but whom he nevertheless saw around him every day, represented the highest and most heroic deeds he had ever done, the best friend he had ever had, and an enchanting little girl who loved him dearly.  And one of the great strengths of the movie is that when he sees them, we see them.  We, too, have to choose to know they are not there.

How did Nash do that?  It isn’t so hard to see why he would have wanted to.  It was his only way to have a life outside a mental institution.  What is hard is to see how he was able to.  As I see it, Alicia is how he was able to.  He made the contribution he made because she made the contribution she made.

What Alicia did seems to me every bit as hard as what John did.  The man she was married to at the time she gave that account to Sol, was a bumbler and entirely untrustworthy to boot.  He took his antipsychotic meds sometimes and sometimes not.  When he did not take them, he succumbed to the fantasies that had seduced him since his years as an undergraduate.  He couldn’t be trusted to look after their baby, even briefly.  She knew that she herself was not safe from harm when he was in the grip of these fantasies.  And she had no way to know it would ever get any better.

Keep that in mind as you are thinking of these two things Alicia said to Sol.  The first is “I am transformed into someone who loves him.”  And before that, “…He is transformed into someone that I love.”  Remarkable!  It is not hard to want those transformations to happen, but wanting did not make them happen.  For that, we need to go further back.  “But then I look at him and I force myself to see the man I married.  And he becomes that man.”  That’s how it happens.

The second is, “It’s not all the time, but it’s enough.”  These wonderful and sustaining “transformations” don’t happen all the time.  The judgment that the times they do happen are “enough” is a separate and distinct act of heroism, as I see it.  As I wrote that, I wondered how Alicia’s mother felt about the choice Alicia was making—whether Alicia’s mother or any of her friends thought that these hit and miss “transformations” ought to be “enough.”

The story of the Nashes, as Ron Howard tells it, is completely clear about what causes what.  John Nash said nothing more than the truth when, in his acceptance speech, he said to Alicia, “You are the reason I am here.”  It was Alicia’s “I force myself to see the man I married” which undergirded John’s “I choose not to indulge certain appetites” and it was his refusal to indulge those appetites that took him to Stockholm to receive his Nobel prize.

Posted in Love and Marriage, Movies | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

The DEBT I owed

How does this line strike you?  “I was raised by a cool systematic father and a warm episodic mother.”  Of all the material that wound up in the 106 page document, it is my favorite.  It heads the third paragraph on page three of a Chapter called “Biography” in a document which, at the time I wrote it, didn’t have a title at all and there was no plan to give it one.

My mind has been wandering back to this document lately.  It has a name now.  I call the collection of essays, The DEBT We Owe, the “we” referring to parents generally.  It has been ten years this month since I finished the last one and emailed that last one to my three children.  I don’t know if I am moved more by my amazement that a decade has passed already or by some not quite clear feeling that any relevant statute of limitations has run out by now.

My three children were 41, 39, and 37 years old when I started these essays.  I knew I couldn’t write the essays without their cooperation so the first thing I did is call them and ask if they would help.  It was the feeling of writing an essay and sending it off into the void that I most feared.  I was pretty sure I couldn’t keep writing under those circumstances, so I asked them if they would email me every week when they got that week’s essay.  They didn’t have to read the essay; they were responsible only to tell me that they had received it.  All three agreed and, to the best of my recollection, I received confirmatory emails from all three for the next 52 weeks.  The most common such response was, “Got it.  Thanks, Dad.”  The picture shows what it felt like to get that kind of help from my kids.

The essays were supposed to be about theology.  I’ll grant you it’s an odd topic for man in his 60s to choose for his adult children, but one or the other of them would respond very positively from time to time to religious writers who looked like quacks to me.  So the project in its first incarnation was something like teaching small children to read the nutrition information on the label of the food they are thinking of buying.  Teaching them where that information is and why it is important isn’t like telling them what to eat.  That never worked with my children anyway.  It was like equipping them to make choices that would enable them to pursue their own goals.

So the theology I was prepared to offer them (mine) was supposed to enable them to “read the label” and make their own judgments.  It was a project that even a very liberal and permissive father (me) could justify.  That is not, of course, how it worked out.  It turned out to be better than that in every way.

First, after receiving their willingness to help me, I sat down and wrote a bunch of theology.  Not essays; just a bunch of theology.  It was only after I had written quite a bit that I realized that the kids couldn’t get to these positions even if they wanted to unless they were starting from my starting point.  And that isn’t where they were starting.  So I started writing about how we can know things; epistemological questions, but still not yet essays.  My idea was that if they knew my views about epistemology, they would be able to follow the “logic” that led me to hold the theological views I hold.  None of this was intended to be persuasive; only descriptive.[1]

That didn’t work either.  Their childhoods had been very different from mine.  The epistemological views I held simply did not arise naturally from their childhoods as it did from mine.  To follow my journey, they needed to know why I had felt the need to formulate the ideas I had about how we can know things and they had to know why it was so important to me—especially if it was not all that important to them.  So I gave up, temporarily, on my epistemological writings and started writing about my childhood and the first sentence I wrote about my childhood was “I was raised by a cool systematic father and a warm episodic mother.”[2]

The project by now was to tell them enough about how I grew up that they would understand why I made the epistemology choices I had made and enough about epistemology to understand how they supported the theological positions I had adopted.  And after I had written enough theology, I noted that those writings didn’t say much about what it meant to me to live my life as a Christian, so I subdivided the theological writings and called the more practical ones, “discipleship.”  It was well after those divisions had been made that I noticed I now had four “chapters,” one beginning with B (biography); one with E (epistemology); one with T (theology); and one with D (discipleship).  It didn’t take much rearranging to make those D-E-B-T; nor did it take much to think that there was an important sense that these essays were something I owed my adult children.  It was, as the title of this post has it, “The DEBT I owed.”

When I pitched it to the kids, I promised that no essay would be longer than two pages and I held to that.  I didn’t play with the font size, although some weeks I wanted to.  I didn’t play with the margins, although some weeks I wanted to.  I did re-write essays that I thought when I finished them were “just right.”  But they were not just right because there were two lines on page three and I had promised there would never be a page three.

The first essay went out on June 15, 2001, a Friday.  The next 51 essays went out on the next 51 Fridays.  There were a few additional essays required to get from one section to another, so the numbers I am using her don’t quite add up, but there were six biographical essays, ten epistemological essays, nineteen theological essays, and fifteen discipleship essays, counting the last one, called “Looking Back,” which was a celebration of the year we had spent together.

It is not at all uncommon for the giver of a gift or the teacher of a course to realize afterward that he, himself, was the principal beneficiary.  That is certainly true here.  No child is really called to love his father as a debt.  It doesn’t work.  But if it did, I would say that my children have paid their debt.  Not only did they write me every week to say that they had received that week’s essay—and you can imagine where in their priorities reassuring an anxious father fell—but it turned out to matter to us all that we had run the whole race together and were still together at the end.  I learned a great deal about who I have been and why I adopted the epistemology I did and what the overall, often reconsidered structure of my theology is, and just how those beliefs express themselves in the life to which my faith has called me.


[1] I did have the model, however, of learning to understand and even to appreciate the path my father took to establishing his own views.  I never shared the views, entirely, but knowing where he started and how he proceeded helped me to honor the man for the journey he had begun and completed.  I think that is what I was hoping for from my own children.

[2] Since I was writing about myself, the phrase “autobiographical writings” would be more narrowly appropriate.  I justify my choice of “biographical” instead by noting that a)  autobiography is a subfield, a kind of biography and b) that I needed a B for my title and could not use an A.

Posted in ways of knowing | Tagged , , , , , | Leave a comment

Robots are “better than nothing”

Back in the old days, when there began to be science fiction fantasies about robots taking over the world, reassurance came with the line, “You can always just unplug them.”  And, with a quibble occasioned by robotic security measures, that is still true.  But what if you didn’t want to unplug them.  Then what?

I’m going to be working with some of the implications of Sherry Turkle’s superb book, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other.  This is Dr. Turkle.   It’s the   “ expecting less from each other” part that first caught my interest and it still the part I find most worrying.  I began to find it worrying well before I got to the part about Roxxxy, the sex robot.

Here are some fragments of a conversation she had with “Bruce.” 

In 1983, thirteen year-old Bruce talked about robots and argued for the unique “emotionality” of people.  Bruce rested his case on the idea that computers and robots are “perfect,” while people are “imperfect,” flawed and frail.  Robots, he said, “do everything right;” people “do the best they know how.”  But for Bruce it was human imperfection that makes for the ties that bind.  Specifically, his own limitations made him feel close to his father (I have a lot in common with my father…we both have chaos.”)

Twenty-five years later, Howard, fifteen, compares his father to the idea of a robot confidant and his father does not fare well in the comparison.

 Howard thinks the robot would be better able to grasp the intricacies of high school life.  “Its database would be larger than Dad’s.  Dad has knowledge of basic things, but not enough of high school.”  In contrast to Bruce’s sense that robots are not qualified to have an opinion about the goings-on in families, Howard hopes that robots might be specially trained to take care of “the elderly and children”—something he doesn’t see the people around him as much interested in.

From Bruce to Howard, Turkle says in summary, “human fallibility has gone from being an endearment to a liability.”  What’s going on here?

Part of it, the least scary part, is that the people Turkle has been talking to feel that robots have less of a downside than humans.  Here are Harry, a 42-year-old architect, and Jane, a 36-year-old teacher.  Both are “relating to” a robot named AIBO, seen at the left.

Harry knows that AIBO is not aware of him as a person but says, “I don’t feel bad about this.  A pet isn’t as aware of me as a person might be…Dogs don’t measure up to people…Each level of creature simply does their best.  I like it that he [AIBO] recognizes me as his master.”  Jane says she turns to AIBO for “amusement,” but also for “companionship.”  Jane looks forward to its company after a long workday.  Jane talks to her AIBO.  “Spending time” with AIBO means sharing the events of her day, “like who I’m having lunch with at school, which students give me trouble.”  Her husband, says Jane, is not interested in these topics.  It is more comfortable to talk to AIBO than to force her husband to listen to stories that bore him.

These functions of the robots match the criterion Turkle calls “better than nothing.”  Someone, we don’t know who, is not regarding Harry as “the master” (her master?) in the way he wants and AIBO is “better than nothing.”  Jane’s husband is not interested in who Jane had lunch with at school or which students are giving her trouble, so she tells AIBO.  That is, after all, “better than nothing.”

I’ve always said that if there is only one horse in the race, you know who is going to win.  But I am not sure these examples are like that.  Harry wants to be someone’s (something’s?) master but has apparently not found anyone who wants him as a his/her/its master.  AIBO is not going to help Harry wonder what it is about himself that wants to be a master

Jane wants “someone” to tell the day’s stories to.  Her husband isn’t interested, so she tells them to AIBO—“sharing,” she says, the events of her day.[1]  She gets to tell the stories without watching her husband be bored.  The husband gets off without having to hear the stories at all.  But why does the husband not want to hear the stories?  Why does Jane not tell the stories in a way that interests her husband?   These stories are about her, after all.  Does she tell too many stories?  Do the stories crowd out some things her husband would like to say if he had the chance?  What is going on in this marriage?  For all those questions, AIBO is a step in the wrong direction.

Which brings us to Roxxxy, the sex robot.

Roxxxy cannot move, although it (she) has electronically warmed skin and internal organs that pulse.  It (she) does, however make conversation.  The robot’s creator, Douglas Hines, helpfully offers, “Sex only goes so far—then you want to be able to talk to the person.”  So, for example, when Roxxxy senses that her hand is being held, the robot says “I love holding hands with you” and moves into more erotic conversations when the physical caresses become more intimate.  One can choose different personalities for Roxxxy, ranging from wild to frigid.

If Harry and Jane didn’t make you want to stop and think, how about Roxxxy?  Again, the first justifications come from the down side of the equation.  Here’s Wesley.

Ex-wives have told him he is too moody.  He sees himself as a “pressure” on a woman and he feels pressure as well because he has not been able to protect women he cared for from his “ups and downs.”  He likes the idea of a robot because he could act naturally—it could not be hurt by his dark moods.  Wesley considers the possibility of two “women,” one real and the other artificial: “Maybe I would want a robot that would be the perfect mate—less needs—and a real woman.  The robot could take some of the pressure off the real woman.  She wouldn’t have to perform emotionally at such a high level, really an unrealistic level…I could stay in my comfort zone.

Here we have the “better than nothing” defense again; this time mixed with a “real woman.”  Wesley thinks he might be able to live with a real woman if he had a robot who could “take some of the pressure off.”    Here’s Roxxxy and a friend.  It looks like the friend who is having the drink.

Turkle worries—and now that I have read her, I worry too—about the transition from the “better than nothing” defense to the “better than anything” defense.  I’d like to take a look at that next time, but there is a darker side to even this first step.  The Furbies, a children’s robot of the 1998 holiday season, were built so they would shut down if they were “abused.”  Scholars who work in Turkle’s field debated at the time whether shutting down was the best response for a robot (does not provide reinforcement to the abuser) or whether it would be better for the abuser to experience the simulated distress a Furby was perfectly capable of producing.  It’s hard to know.

But when it comes to sex robots, it is even harder to know.  Let’s say this sex robot—bound and gagged in duct tape—is Wesley’s “other woman.”  What happens when his human woman objects to doing for Wesley what Roxxxy doesn’t seem to mind?

Uncomfortable yet?  Me too.

 

 


[1] I have been wary for some time now of the perversion of the word sharing.  Sharing is “a good thing” because the thing being shared is good.  Sharing food with people who need food is good; sharing warmth with people who need warmth is good.  Sharing the stories of the day might be good if someone wanted to share them, but Jane doesn’t have anyone who wants to share them.  Telling them to her husband is not likely to seem like “sharing” to the husband.  Telling them to AIBO is not, in fact, “sharing” them at all, but Jane feels better for having told the stories even when they are not “shared.”

Posted in Paying Attention, Politics, ways of knowing, Words | Tagged | 2 Comments

Oh What a Tangled Web We Weave…

I have two anecdotes to share today.  I still read Orwell’s 1984 every now and then, just to keep the calluses on my mind thick and supple.  It helps me deal with things like this.

Whenever I go to the airport in Portland—on my way, usually, to the Southwest counter—I pass the United Airlines counter, where they advertise their policy on luggage.  It isn’t that I don’t admire the candor.  They give you the price for transporting one bag or two or more.  But if you aren’t taking a bag at all, they announce that it will be…free.

It will be free.  They will not charge you for not checking a bag.  Or look at it this way.  If you will agree to travel without luggage, they will agree not to charge you for the luggage you are not taking.

Yesterday, I had a conversation with a very pleasant young woman at The Oregonian, Portland’s only daily newspaper.  It wasn’t a very comfortable conversation for me because I was up in Forest Park running and as I stopped to talk to her, I began to chill.  And then, as you will see, I got warm again.

She was just checking to see why we had stopped subscribing to The Oregonian.  Why we actually did stop is not germane here—Bette found too little news in it to continue reading it—but when she had fixed it in her mind that we had allowed our subscription to run out, she said that there was an amount due on the account.  I was incredulous.  We pay by the year.

But that wasn’t it, she said.  It was that after our subscription ran out, they continued to deliver papers to our house.  The said it was the Oregonian’s policy to have a “grace period” at the end of a subscription.  And now she wanted me to pay for the papers they had delivered during the “grace period.”

I hadn’t been running for several minutes, but when she said that—in a breezy and confident way, I will say—I had to work to catch my breath.  “You want me to pay for the papers you delivered during the grace period?” I said.  I saw where that was going and switched quickly to a less explosive response.  I said that I was happy to pay for all the papers we had asked them to sell us, but I was not eager to pay for the papers they gave us afterward.  That turned out to be enough to end the conversation amicably.

But I am a man with a theological vocabulary and she had nicked a corner of that vocabulary by putting “grace” and “pay” that close together in the same sentence.  I came worryingly close to asking her if she had ever heard of the Protestant Reformation and whether paying for grace didn’t seem…well, confusing.

But I didn’t.

Posted in Words | 1 Comment

Colleagueship at the The York Times

Probably, the New York Times doesn’t have meetings where the columnists they publish sit down around a table and talk about how things are going at the paper.  Maybe they never did.  But if they used to do that, I’d recommend that the practice be suspended, at least briefly.

Here is a brief excerpt from David Brooks’s column for May 21.

Forty years ago, corporate America was bloated, sluggish and losing ground to competitors in Japan and beyond. But then something astonishing happened. Financiers, private equity firms and bare-knuckled corporate executives initiated a series of reforms and transformations.

The process was brutal and involved streamlining and layoffs. But, at the end of it, American businesses emerged leaner, quicker and more efficient.

Now we are apparently going to have a presidential election about whether this reform movement was a good thing. Last week, the Obama administration unveiled an attack ad against Mitt Romney’s old private equity firm, Bain Capital, portraying it as a vampire that sucks the blood from American companies. Then Vice President Joseph Biden Jr. gave one of those cable-TV-type speeches, lambasting Wall Street and saying we had to be a country that makes things again.

And here is a brief excerpt from Paul Krugman’s column for May 24.

Actually, before I get to that, let me take a moment to debunk a fairy tale that we’ve been hearing a lot from Wall Street and its reliable defenders — a tale in which the incredible damage runaway finance inflicted on the U.S. economy gets flushed down the memory hole, and financiers instead become the heroes who saved America.

Once upon a time, this fairy tale tells us, America was a land of lazy managers and slacker workers. Productivity languished, and American industry was fading away in the face of foreign competition.

Then square-jawed, tough-minded buyout kings like Mitt Romney and the fictional Gordon Gekko came to the rescue, imposing financial and work discipline. Sure, some people didn’t like it, and, sure, they made a lot of money for themselves along the way. But the result was a great economic revival, whose benefits trickled down to everyone.

You can see why Wall Street likes this story. But none of it — except the bit about the Gekkos and the Romneys making lots of money — is true.

Let’s see now.  We know that David Brooks is not “on Wall Street” and Krugman gives us only two categories to choose from.  So I guess Brooks is one of Wall Street’s “reliable defenders.”  And the “fairy tale” Krugman is “debunking” is the previous column of his colleague at the New York Times, David Brooks.

Oh well, maybe they laugh about it over a beer afterwards.

 

Posted in Politics | Tagged , , , | 2 Comments

Quiet: Some Reflections by an Introvert

This post will eventually be about introversion.  Specifically, it will be about a marvelous book about introversion:  Quiet, by Susan Cain.  It has a subtitle too—The Power of Introverts in a World that Can’t Stop Talking—but the subtitle doesn’t represent the book.  Mostly, the book is about three things that matter to me.  The first is society’s consistent, but largely unconscious  preference for extroverts.  Extroversion is the default value and if you do not or can not act like an extrovert, you have some explaining to do.  The second is about fundamental condition introverts share.  You will be surprised.  The third is what we—we introverts—can do about it.

“We introverts.”  OK, so I’m an introvert.  I’m not shy; I just like social environments with not too much buzz in them.  And when I do things that are best done in an extroverted mode—like lecturing to my university classes or making a social phone call— I need to take some time to get back in touch with myself afterwards.

Let’s look at society’s preference for extroverts.  This is society’s default standard.  It is not preached as a virtue; it is presumed.  When you plan a party with what “people like to do” in mind, you are going to plan a party where extroverts will thrive.  This is exactly the kind of rule it is important to know about, because it’s not hard to make it through a party designed for extroverts.  You find someone else who looks uncomfortable, strike up a conversation, and find a quiet corner of the room.  What’s hard is not knowing what’s the matter with me.  Everybody else looks OK.

I ran into this problem of the “default style” after my wife, Marilyn, died in 2003.  I was grieving.  I felt bad, of course, but I wasn’t confused.  I felt just about the way I thought I should feel under the circumstances.  But it turns out that there is a “right way” to grieve.  It is a style Doka and Martin call the “intuitive” style,  rather than the “instrumental” style.  The instrumental style which is more natural to me.  Their research shows that this style is the gold standard in the field of mental health professionals.  For them, it is the default style of mourning, as extroversion is the default style of social interaction.  It is when you are grieving in the expressive style that the counselors know you are doing it right.  Failing to do it in that style means you are doing it wrong.  And if the expressive style makes things worse, you need to work harder at it.  Hm.

So I get it now: people expect you to be extroverted.  If you don’t know that, you fail a lot and wonder what is wrong with you.  If you do know it, you find a way around it—as in retiring to the quiet corner of a party for a conversation—and everything is fine.

So what is this “fundamental condition” that introverts share?  It is a preference for “low buzz” environments.  Here’s an interesting experiment, which, after I describe it, I am going to use as a metaphor.  Introverts and extroverts were asked to play a challenging word game in which they had to learn, through trial and error, the governing principles of the game.  While playing, they wore headphones that emitted random burst of noise.  They were asked to adjust the volume of their headsets up or down to the level that was “just right.”  On average, the extroverts chose a noise level of 72 decibels, while introverts selected only 55 decibels.  When each group played at the noise level they had chosen—their “sweet spot”—they played equally well.  When each played at the level the other group had chosen, both played worse.

This isn’t just a personal preference either; this is the way the temperamental blueprint is drawn.  Here’s an experiment that catches how fundamental this is.  In 1989, Jerome Kagan gathered five hundred four-month-old infants in his laboratory.  The infants heard tape-recorded voices and balloons popping, saw colorful mobiles dance before their eyes, and inhaled the scent of alcohol on cotton swabs.  About 20% cried lustily and pumped their arms and legs.  Kagan called this group “high-reactive.”  About 40% stayed quiet and placid, moving their arms or legs occasionally, but without the dramatic limb-pumping.

Introverts and extroverts, right?  Yes.  The loud, limb-pumping infants mostly became introverts; the placid, unaffected infants became extroverts.  It isn’t what I expected, but it makes sense.  This one level of stimulation was “just right” for some of the infants and “too much” for others.  The stimulus level was set, to use the word game metaphorically, at 72 decibels and the four-month-old babies who would have been comfortable at 55 decibels, hollered and struggled.  We can only hope that they were not taught, as they grew up, that 72 was the “right level” of stimulation, the level “real people” preferred.  And while we’re hoping, let’s go on and hope that they do not become “low buzz” activists, dedicated to reducing all social environments to 55 decibels.  What they need to know is: a) there is nothing weird about preferring 55 decibels to 72 decibels, b) that in most 72 decibel settings, there are 55 decibel corners and it is OK to search them out, and c) that when they really need to perform in the 72 decibel mode, they will need to find a way to get off by themselves  and recharge afterward.

That last point introduces topic three, which is what to do about it.  Here are some examples.  Extroverts are likely to offer casual information about themselves and think of it as establishing some commonality with the other person.  You have a new dog?  That’s great.  A friend of mine has an amazing tank of saltwater fish!  To that kind of response, I ordinarily look, dumbfounded, at the person and say, “What?”  What the introvert really wants is for me to say that I saw a lot of saltwater fish when I was in the Caribbean last winter and then he can say that he was in Alaska last winter and had a wonderful time climbing a mountain.

That counts as “conversation” for extroverts.  Introverts tend to focus on one or two serious subjects of conversation—often problems or conflicts they are experiencing in school or with kids or with friends.  Even politics.  To my mind—I’m a member of one of these teams, remember, so I’m not being fair—that first tag team “conversation” is a travesty and my partner, the mountain climber whose friend has salt water fish—is a jerk.  To my mind, the pair Cain calls “introverts” are just having a conversation.  Each listens to the other and each responds to what has been said.

What to do?  First, make up your mind that they aren’t doing it wrong.  They are interacting the way 72 decibel people like to interact.  Second, offer your conversation partner a chance to talk about just one thing.  He can choose what the thing is provided we agree to actually talk about it for a while.  Probably that won’t work, but it doesn’t hurt (much) to try.  Third, find someone who likes to have conversations of the sort you like.

Once you know it isn’t you, it isn’t all that hard to fix.

 

 

 

Posted in Books | Tagged , | 2 Comments

The Best Exotic Marigold Hotel

Bette and I saw this movie last night with a friend who had served in the Peace Corps in India.  We enjoyed his comments a good deal, but even without his additional insights into Indian life, it would have been a movie worth seeing.  Judi Dench and Bill Nighy, particularly, are superb.

This short reflection, however, is on a line delivered with considerable intensity by Sonny, the manager of the Best Exotic Marigold Hotel.  He is fending off complaints by several of his elderly British guests that things in their rooms just don’t work.  “We have a saying in India,” he says.  “Everything will be all right in the end… if it’s not all right then it’s not the end.”

That really tickled me.  You’ll notice that there is no referent to “in the end.”  The end of what?  Today?  The monsoon season?  Recorded history?  Some of those meanings are truly relevant to the complaints the guests are making.  Others, not so much.

Also, please note that what sounds first like a promise of help, turns out to be only an indicator of when the end of the episode will occur.  You know the end of the episode is not at hand unless everything is all right, but what you wanted to know when you came down to the desk was when things were going to be all right, and more particularly, what the manager was going to do to make everything all right.

Sonny’s tone is completely assuring.  His placement of his assurance in the wisdom sayings of India is a nice touch.  You almost want to turn away from the desk with a lighter heart.  Perhaps a door is about to be put into the doorway of your room.  Perhaps the telephones will begin to work.  Perhaps even hot water.

But on your way back to your room, you realize that the only thing you were really assured of is that “it is not the end” and you know it is not because “things are not all right.”

It’s beautiful.

Posted in Movies | 2 Comments

Inside Accounts and Outside Accounts

It strikes me now as odd that when I saw the title—Systematic Theology: A Historicist Perspective—on the shelf as I pushed the dust mop by it during my first year of doctoral study, the word that really caught my attention was “a.”  This was in the early 70s, a time when the rule about the sound of h- (as in historicist) rather than the presence of an h- (as in heir) was still often abused and I liked it that this Harvard theologian, whom I had never heard of, took the trouble to get it right.

That was then.  This is now.  Today, the word I want to work on is “historicist.”  Why does Gordon Kaufman, whose magnum opus this is, take all the trouble to be “historicist?”   What kind of a “history” would matter to a theologian?  What kind of outside account would matter so much to a man who makes his living studying an inside account?

Let me take a moment to set up the dilemma; then I’ll give you a little language that I found in Kaufman’s work.  I just finished reading Jonathan Haidt’s The Righteous Mind.  Wonderful book!  As part of his account of how we got the kinds of brains we have and to account for the central role of “team sports” like religion (“team sports” in Haidt’s term) in the way our brains work, Haidt gives a perfectly respectable history of the human race from an evolutionary perspective.  I accept it in every particular.

I have also just finished listening to David Christian’s forty-eight lectures on “big history,” which begins before the Big Bang and continues to the present.  In that process, he too covers what kinds of advantages homo sapiens brought with them—with us—into the new paleolithic world.  It included the kinds of luxuries human societies began to develop when they entered the agriculture era; luxuries like a priestly class that could seek the blessings of the gods on the crops, for instance, and who could live in considerable comfort because of the offerings of the gullible villagers.  I don’t have any trouble with that account either.

I call those accounts “views from the outside.”  Their proponents call them “true” or “evidence-based” or “scholarly.”  For a theologian, however, even one who calls himself a “historicist,” you would imagine it would be pretty much beside the point.  That raises the question, “Is there another way to look at history—a view that a Christian might call a view from “inside” the community of faith?”  Yes.  There is.  That will be what this post is about.

Kaufman tells a parable of a high school boy who wants to be a physician.  He takes the requisite courses and is admitted to med school.  But then he drops out.  Then he returns.  Then he is drafted—this book has a 1968 copyright—and then returns.  And he takes a lot of courses in music while he is in school.  If at the end, he becomes a musician or a long-haul truck driver, we can look at his checkered history and conclude, with no surprise, that he didn’t, after all, show a lot of diligence in med school.  If at the end, he becomes a doctor, we might wonder about the episodes that are harder to understand.  We might ask the boy about the things that confused us and learn that he dropped out to earn money to return; that the draft happens to nearly everyone with medical training; and that the music courses were intended to leaven the kind of life he had seen among physicians, which was all work and had no time for music.  These all make sense.  If we stand back, two things emerge.  The first is that the main character in this story never had the sense that his purpose wavered, but he might grant that some things required explanation.  The second is that everything makes sense, when you take the explanation as the key to the narrative.

That story illustrates Kaufman’s notion of God’s providence.  All these clues, he says: “…remain problematic and dubious unless in one or more of them the purposer himself chose to communicate what he was seeking to do…Such a moment of self-disclosure by the purpose, of course, would never compel credence; we all know well the deceits and conceits with which agents often clothe their activities.  One could choose either to believe or disbelieve that the true character of the history had been disclosed.”

That’s the inside perspective in general.  There is a revelatory tradition.  For many religions (not all) there is a God or gods who could “intend,” so that events that might seem to outsiders to point in all directions, can be seen by insiders all to point in the same direction.  Learning that the kid dropped out of school so he could make enough money to re-enroll, for instance, takes behaviors that seems contradictory from the outside and reconciles them as complementary from the inside.  In fact, you don’t have to be religious to have an explanatory frame of reference.[1]  Haidt says that humans who scavenged for their food had no need for or time for deities.  With agriculture, there was both time—a stable set of religious leaders emerged—and need; the prayers for fertility were crucial to the survival of the village.  I see nothing at all wrong with that as a perspective.

Here’s the best I can do to illustrate the inside/outside problem.  I wrote a short piece about this to my kids ten years ago and the italicized sections are excerpted from that essay.  They are the inside perspective.  They draw on the revelatory tradition in the same way the student’s family and friends draw on his account of his purposes.  The regular font comments following represent the outside perspective which, to my mind, should be embraced without controversy by everyone.

God created beings who would be able to choose a relationship with Him and a setting where they could live. There is, everyone agrees, a habitable earth, and most people (not all) agree that we freely choose the principal commitments of our lives.  It is the agent, not the result, that is the “inside view.”

 They didn’t choose Him, however, and the choice they did make (autonomy) produced disastrous results for both the creatures and the setting. There is no question that “codes” of law and ethics emerged among humans and that they used these codes to define and decide what was “right.”  Kaufman asserts that there must have been a prior time—whenever it was—before these codes emerged.  The Christian tradition identifies it mythically as a time when humans could have lived by obedience, rather than by self-determination.  You should be thinking of “Adam” and “Eve” and “the apple.” Anthropologists have no idea what loyalties there might have been in such a time.  Kaufman doesn’t either, but he links the empirical emergence of self-government with the Christian myth of the Fall.

 So God set about restoring his creatures.  This is Kaufman’s assertion of the purposiveness of the next steps–steps theologians will call, collectively, “redemption.”  Obviously, there is no outside confirmation of this.

To begin this redemption, God made a culture—or waited patiently until a culture appeared (there is no reasonable way to choose between these two mechanisms)—in which social cohesion was very strong and in which the notion of “binding agreements” was honored. No covenants can be made with people who don’t understand just how binding a binding agreement is.  No secular historian is going to want to deny that the people of Israel took the notion of a “binding agreement” as the central commitment to “their deity” or to “the God they imagined had rescued them.”  Those beliefs are facts, at least in principle.  The purposiveness of God in bringing them about is a hypothesis.

 He revealed Himself to these people as a desert despot, like their own leaders: someone with whom personal relationship is everything and binding agreements or “covenants” could be made.  But He was not a desert despot.  He was other.  He was “the one God.”  He was autonomous, holy, loving.  Any historian could follow the development of “religiosity” generally, but tracing the development from small and temperamental local gods to exclusive monotheism is commonplace.  That happened.  The meaning of what happened, or whether there was a meaning at all, is not a question that can be decided from the outside.

He identified Himself to them by bringing them out of slavery and settling them in a land of their own and he made a new covenant with them.  There were several waves of emigrations of Hebrews from Israel.  They may not have been “a people” in Egypt.  Probably a more general ethnic integration occurred between Egypt and Palestine.  Further integration certainly occurred as the tribes conquered Palestine.  Without question, they wound up living in Palestine and having a capitol city in Jerusalem.

This was a new kind of covenant:  “I rescued you from Egypt not because you were worthy, but because I loved you.  You will be my servant people, containing and protecting the light I gave you, so that eventually it can be shared with everyone.” This understanding of what the covenant with God implied was always in tension with other understandings.  There is no question that both understandings were there and that they were in conflict with each other.  Whether either was true is an inside question, not an outside question.

It turned out to be a hard sell.  And centuries of conquest by their more powerful neighbors didn’t solve the problem.  It did, however, produce a myth of a messiah; an anointed one—God’s own choice—who would arise from among them and cast off the hated imperial armies.  There is no question that there were messianic expectations among the Jews after their return from Babylon.  The successful revolts of the Maccabees fed those expectations but, given the geopolitical realities of the time, did not satisfy them.

Then God sent them the messiah the myth foretold, but not the messiah they were expecting.  This messiah was not a military leader; he was a rabbi.  And it turned out that the goal was not restoring this “covenant people” to power, but to open, through them, a whole new category of people who would belong to Him in a new way.  It is not an ethnic group, but a new category–people who will come to the light Jesus held up and will live in that light.  It is people who will ask to be followers, but who will become family. There is no way to verify the messiahship of Jesus, of course, but the description of the “new category” reflects the preaching of the early Christian missionaries and is unquestionably the direction Christianity took as early as the midpoint of the First Century.  “The church” became “a gentile church” very quickly.

In this way of looking at things, “the facts” are not in question.  “The details” of the sacred accounts are not only in question, but are sometimes refutable.  More commonly, they are unknowable.  Did the Israelites take Jericho, for instance?  Yes.  Did Jericho have walls?  No one had found them the last I heard and it wasn’t for any lack of looking.  Did “a handful of trumpet players” (Harold Hill’s phrasing in The Music Man) take down the “famous fabled walls of Jericho?”[2]  Any history shows that the facts essential to the story—the large plot elements—are there.  The history that begins with God’s intentions accepts those facts and weaves them into a fabric of meaning.

It seems to me that a very nice dance could be arranged where the insiders bow to the outsiders on the facts and the outsiders curtsy to the insiders on meaning.  Writing a line like that makes me feel like I’m trying to arrange a nice little dance between the Sharks and the Jets.

 


[1] Whether you would want to call it “revelatory,” a term Kaufman uses for whatever is taken to be the key to understanding the larger pattern, is another question, of course.  For Kaufman, the empiricism offered by the Enlightenment is “revelatory” if it is taken as the fundamental level of meaning.

[2] I have heard a joke I like about the fall of Jericho.  Joshua arranges his “band of trumpet players” in a formation seven across and marched around the city and had them blow their horns.  Nothing.  Then he organized them in a formation fourteen across and when they blew the trumpets, the walls came a’tumblin’ down.  Moral:  With enough bandwidth, you can do almost anything.

Posted in Biblical Studies, Theology, ways of knowing | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

Who Will Be Left Behind?

I heard a new word this week: senilicide.  A lot of words that are based on the Latin senex, “old” are familiar to me.  I have taught about this root for many years, pointing out in the process that Senate and senile come from the same root; let them make of it what they will.  So it wasn’t the meaning of the word that caught my ear.

I was listening to a lecture about resources and nomadism.  When you move from place to place, the members of your group who can keep up, do so; the members who cannot, do not.  That could lead, and the lecturer thought it had led, to the practice of killing the weaker of a set of twins.  Less to carry.  Leaving the frail elderly behind would have the same effect, of course.

So for nomads, senilicide and infanticide are just two necessary ways of making sure everyone is “carrying his own weight” so to speak.  It was hardly a decision at all.  When agriculture became the dominant economic mode, those societies could afford to “carry” everyone—both twins, for instance, and the frail elderly.  At that point, they needed to actually decide what to do, a luxury the nomads never had.

These words put me in mind of  some recent American policy debates.  The early end of the right to life scale is dominated by Republicans, who, compared to Democrats, are against contraception education, against contraception services, and against abortion.  Presumably, these policies would produce more young people., more of whom would be fragile at birth.  The Republicans also dominate the late end of the right to life scale.  The section of Obama’s signature accomplishment, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, that would have required Medicare to pay for end of life counseling for anyone who wanted it, was stripped out at the insistence of Republicans.  You might have heard of the “death squads.”  The insistence that we keep alive bodies which are in a persistently vegetative state is on the Republican end, too.

These two positions—both the (anti) infanticide and the (anti) senilicide ends of the spectrum—are Republican territory.  Naturally, since these positions cost a lot more resources—this was the dilemma faced by the nomads—you would expect the Republicans to favor higher taxes in order to guarantee care for these “extra” infants and elders.  Those costs would include extra pre- and post-natal care for the young ones.  It would require a good deal of funding as well as rigorous oversight to be sure that seniors are adequately cared for by people who know how to do it and especially, how to help their families do it.  That would make the Republicans the high tax party in so far as those funds would be necessary to care for the very old and the very young.

But, of course, the Republicans are not the high tax party.

So who’s going to be left behind if it is not the old or the young?  Whose –cide are the Republicans really on?  Poor people, it turns out: the uninsured and the underinsured.  These are people who, given the way our healthcare system distributes preventive care and  therapeutic treatment, are going to have to be “left behind.” 

Everything is clearer when you move from age—the infanticide/senilicide axis—to class.  The wealthy are going to do very well in the private insurance, private treatment environment.  The wealthy will always “carry their own weight” unless you are talking about the current state of the tax system.  For the various middle classes, some will and some won’t.  No one will, I assure you, who develops a condition for which the medicine alone costs $8000 a month.  Among the poor, prevention is nearly absent and insurance is a pipe dream.  These people will absolutely not carry their weight and will, in the nomadic economy the Republicans seem to be proposing, be left behind when they can no longer keep up.

Posted in Political Psychology, Politics | Tagged , , , | 2 Comments