It should not be too hard to grasp the idea that you can’t give ultimatums to people who have alternatives. The classic formulation of this occurred in a memorable episode of the West Wing in which Leo McGarry, the President’s Chief of Staff cranks up the heat on the President. It is clear to Leo that there is an action that only the President can take and that it is urgent that he take it immediately. He leans over the President’s desk and says something to the effect of “You HAVE TO do this!.” Finally, President Bartlett looks up and says, “Or else….what?”
A foreign policy governed by ultimatum is a very tricky thing at best. For one thing, it changes theOr Else….What?
It should not be too hard to grasp the idea that you can’t give ultimatums to people who have alternatives. The classic formulation of this occurred in a memorable episode of the West Wing in which Leo McGarry, the President’s Chief of Staff cranks up the heat on the President. It is clear to Leo that there is an action that only the President can take and that it is urgent that he take it immediately. He leans over the President’s desk and says something to the effect of “You HAVE TO do this!.” Finally, President Bartlett looks up and says, “Or else….what?”
A foreign policy governed by ultimatum is a very tricky thing at best. For one thing, it changes theOr Else….What?
It should not be too hard to grasp the idea that you can’t give ultimatums to people who have alternatives. The classic formulation of this occurred in a memorable episode of the West Wing in which Leo McGarry, the President’s Chief of Staff cranks up the heat on the President. It is clear to Leo that there is an action that only the President can take and that it is urgent that he take it immediately. He leans over the President’s desk and says something to the effect of “You HAVE TO do this!.” Finally, President Bartlett looks up and says, “Or else….what?”
A foreign policy governed by ultimatum is a very tricky thing at best. For one thing, it changes the traditional idea of U. S. foreign policy. In the shadow cast by the present chaos, it is easy to idealize the recent—post 1945—conduct of American foreign policy, but this at least can be said. The centerpiece of American foreign policy has been the construction and maintenance of alliances that will accomplish the goals of the members. The policy of Containment—if the Soviet Union can be kept from expanding, it will eventually implode—may not be our finest hour, but the goals were clear, cooperation was widespread, and it was successful.
The U.S. served as the nation to formulate the idea, to specify what part other nations would need to play in this strategy, and to support them in those efforts. So long as the threat was clear and imminent, holding the coalition together was manageable. But under all circumstances, the policy choices involved the practices of the alliance.
One of the very early effects of President Trump bargaining practices is to fracture alliances into sets of two-party dealmaking. Driving hard bargains with a trading partner—or even with a military partner—is a tricky proposition. I want to consider in just a moment some of the things that make it tricky, but it is worth noting in passing that the alliance is gone when we do that. The politics of managing an alliance to achieve common purposes is, of course, difficult, but it is simply incompatible with splitting the alliance up into bargaining units and dealing with each so as to maximize U. S. advantage. So when we move from the one mode of foreign policy practices to the other—from an alliance-based to a deal-based mode—we lose all the advantages of the alliance. We can hope—clearly President Trump DOES hope that the deals we will be able to make will be so good for America that the loss of the alliance partners will be compensated for. The nations who were the alliance partners do not go away, of course. France, Germany, and Britain are still where they were; but the common purpose that made them alliance partners has been lost in the rush to make one on one deals.
That’s the major problem, as I see it, in shifting to dealmaking among allies. It is, briefly, that they are no longer allies. But what happens to nations who were, until recently, being courted?
Everyone knows that depending on the question being asked, there are our guys, their guys, and those who have not make up their minds on the question being asked. The U. S got in the habit, during the Cold War, of thinking about those groupings in very broad and stable categories. We called “our guys” the First World, “their guys” the Second World, and those who were not playing the game or had not yet chosen sides, “the Third World.” That seemed appropriate for issues as broad as “freedom under U. S leadership” v. domination under “Communism.”
But when we change to one on one bargaining, the categories lose their power and the question comes up of just how far you can push an antagonist in bargaining. If he has no option but to comply—in another setting, we might quibble about whether that is really “bargaining” at all—then the U. S can push their demands quite far. Always keeping an eye on that line that separates “continuing the conversation” from “opting out entirely.”
A good example of a nation in this dilemma is India, the most populous country in the world and an economic powerhouse. The Trump administration has been bringing a good deal of pressure to bear on India, beginning with tariffs, as usual, to comply with U. S economic demands. The level of pressure seems to presume that India has no alternative but to continue the conversation and try not to lose more than they can afford.
Briefly, the question we ask India by pushing them to the wall is, ‘Or what..”
India has begun to answer that question by opening discussions with Russia, China, and North Korea. We bargained with them—“tariffed at them”—as if they had no alternatives, but it might turn out that they do.
The loss of India as a partner in Asia would be a catastrophic loss, but it is a solid answer to the dangling question, “Or else…what?”traditional idea of U. S. foreign policy. In the shadow cast by the present chaos, it is easy to idealize the recent—post 1945—conduct of American foreign policy, but this at least can be said. The centerpiece of American foreign policy has been the construction and maintenance of alliances that will accomplish the goals of the members. The policy of Containment—if the Soviet Union can be kept from expanding, it will eventually implode—may not be our finest hour, but the goals were clear, cooperation was widespread, and it was successful.
The U.S. served as the nation to formulate the idea, to specify what part other nations would need to play in this strategy, and to support them in those efforts. So long as the threat was clear and imminent, holding the coalition together was manageable. But under all circumstances, the policy choices involved the practices of the alliance.
One of the very early effects of President Trump bargaining practices is to fracture alliances into sets of two-party dealmaking. Driving hard bargains with a trading partner—or even with a military partner—is a tricky proposition. I want to consider in just a moment some of the things that make it tricky, but it is worth noting in passing that the alliance is gone when we do that. The politics of managing an alliance to achieve common purposes is, of course, difficult, but it is simply incompatible with splitting the alliance up into bargaining units and dealing with each so as to maximize U. S. advantage. So when we move from the one mode of foreign policy practices to the other—from an alliance-based to a deal-based mode—we lose all the advantages of the alliance. We can hope—clearly President Trump DOES hope that the deals we will be able to make will be so good for America that the loss of the alliance partners will be compensated for. The nations who were the alliance partners do not go away, of course. France, Germany, and Britain are still where they were; but the common purpose that made them alliance partners has been lost in the rush to make one on one deals.
That’s the major problem, as I see it, in shifting to dealmaking among allies. It is, briefly, that they are no longer allies. But what happens to nations who were, until recently, being courted?
Everyone knows that depending on the question being asked, there are our guys, their guys, and those who have not make up their minds on the question being asked. The U. S got in the habit, during the Cold War, of thinking about those groupings in very broad and stable categories. We called “our guys” the First World, “their guys” the Second World, and those who were not playing the game or had not yet chosen sides, “the Third World.” That seemed appropriate for issues as broad as “freedom under U. S leadership” v. domination under “Communism.”
But when we change to one on one bargaining, the categories lose their power and the question comes up of just how far you can push an antagonist in bargaining. If he has no option but to comply—in another setting, we might quibble about whether that is really “bargaining” at all—then the U. S can push their demands quite far. Always keeping an eye on that line that separates “continuing the conversation” from “opting out entirely.”
A good example of a nation in this dilemma is India, the most populous country in the world and an economic powerhouse. The Trump administration has been bringing a good deal of pressure to bear on India, beginning with tariffs, as usual, to comply with U. S economic demands. The level of pressure seems to presume that India has no alternative but to continue the conversation and try not to lose more than they can afford.
Briefly, the question we ask India by pushing them to the wall is, ‘Or what..”
India has begun to answer that question by opening discussions with Russia, China, and North Korea. We bargained with them—“tariffed at them”—as if they had no alternatives, but it might turn out that they do.
The loss of India as a partner in Asia would be a catastrophic loss, but it is a solid answer to the dangling question, “Or else…what?”





