I’ve got more important things to do.

Surely I do. I must.

That would, at least, make sense of the way I eat. I’ve been puzzled about this for awhile. I eat in a decision-minimizing way. Here are some of the obvious implications.

First, I eat/drink things in the unit sizes they come in. I drink “a cup” of coffee, for instance, and I might have that (I’m at Starbucks, anyway) with “a bagel” and “a package of cream cheese.” The opening bell rings and I start the project. I keep on drinking the coffee until I’m done; I keep on eating the bagel until I’m done. I do make an exception with the cream cheese. Even though it comes in a package (1.5 oz), I use only as much of it as necessary to grease the path of the bagel. [1]

It took me a little while to think of an alternative. It is “some.” So rather than drinking “a cup” of coffee, I drink “some” coffee. That doesn’t eliminate the problems, of course, but it does change their form slightly. But back to the solution side. I could eat “some bagel;” obviously just how much bagel is not specified. That would be the point of the change.

The same logic flows from “a steak” or “a sandwich” or “a beer.” If the project is to eat/drink “it” and “it” comes in an amount that has no necessary relationship to how much I want at the moment, then I would have to make decisions that are independent of the packaging, rather than consenting to the decisions that are implicit in the packaging. And whose decisions were those, I might ask in an idle moment.

Sounds like a lot of work, doesn’t it?

You might think that I am inventing a problem just for the pleasure of solving it, but that is not really the case here. The easy way to deal with this is to eat when you are hungry and to stop when you are no longer hungry. And for people who are tuned to those feelings, that it, I agree, a perfect solution. It doesn’t feel like “making decisions” any more than “deciding” when you have scratched an itch long enough feels like a decision. You just stop at the right time without ever making anything you would call a “decision.”

That’s not how I do it. It is not how I have ever done it. The food winds up on my place—packaged or served—and the bell announcing the beginning of the project sounds (I am imagining the bell, of course) and I start moving toward the finish line. It’s not fast or slow by definition; but it is complete or not yet complete. Sounds pathological, doesn’t it?

What I feel I get from this is the freedom to think my own thoughts or to engage in whatever conversation I am in. I am free from the intrusive stream of questions I would otherwise have to be asking: am I still hungry, what do I feel like eating more of, did that do the job, should I keep on eating/drinking? [2]. I am free to have whatever internal conversation I am having or to participate in whatever social conversation I am having untroubled by the need to make all these decisions. As I implied in the title, I must think I have other things to do that are very important.

This plethora of decisions is replaced by the much simpler, “Am I done yet?” This question is cued up nicely for me by the unit. Have I finished “the sandwich?” is easy; “have I eaten enough sandwich?” is hard. “Have I drunk my cup of coffee?” is easy; “Have I had all the coffee I want right now?” is hard.

I must think that what I would otherwise be doing is incredibly important for me to accept all the costs of not deciding things. That’s not how I experience it, of course. In full project mode, I just begin and make progress and complete the project (the food is gone) with no unnecessary distractions.

It’s sad, really, but it would be a lot of work to change.

[1] This is not as different as you might think from what I would do at home if there were a dish of cream cheese on the table. I would put an amount on my plate and from then on, it would be just like the package. That is how much “there is to eat.”
[2] I see that I am bypassing all questions of whether the tastes and textures are pleasant and interesting. Those are important and I do attend to them, but they don’t help me with the decisionmaking stresses, so I am passing them by this time.

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Toxic Masculinity

Today, I want to think about the expression “toxic masculinity.” [1]. I have three major goals in writing this essay. The first is not to whine about the expression. The second is to try to persuade you that I am not whining about the expression. And finally—at last, something of substance—to look at the place that kind of designation has in our language. This last observation is only about what “toxic” adds to the expression and how that could be improved.

And since the first two are matters of style, I will begin on the third one and you can draw your own conclusions about the first two.

The adjective “toxic” adds nothing of value to the noun “masculinity” as both words are currently used. It would be very helpful if toxic masculinity were the name of one end of the scale of “kinds” or “forms” of masculinity. Unfortunately, that would require a name for the other end of the scale and that is where the expression, in current debate, comes up short. There is no useful name for “the kind of masculinity everyone approves of.”

It is easy to think that non-toxic is the solution to the problem, but negation alone is not going to get this job done. Imagine, for instance, that we were talking about shyness. We have no trouble saying that one person is shy and the other outgoing. “Outgoing” gives us a positive notion of what we are talking about. It is easy to imagine gradations of “outgoingness” or of “shyness” (it works either way) because both are acceptable values and each has its own merit.

That is why “shy” and “non-shy” doesn’t help. It doesn’t answer the question “What characteristics are you thinking about when you say, non-shy?” To which, a good answer might be, “If I knew that, why would I say non-shy?”

Why indeed?

The notion of what men are supposed to be like has not taken on any particular form yet. The notion of what men should be like, which was much more stable when society was more stable, is now in rapid flux. We really don’t know what we want men to be like—men don’t know either—so we are having trouble coming up with a name for the other pole.

This is a problem only at the general level. We have no trouble admiring a particular man. There are virtues [2] that are not sharply gendered. There are ways of being a man that everyone in the setting agrees are just right for that setting or for the marriage or for the group of men friends of which he is a part. The problem comes in talking about masculinity in general. [3]

This is a problem that has no obvious solution. It is not hard to design one. Get a broad agreement among the most powerful stakeholders about what a good contemporary masculinity ought to look like. Define it so that there many kinds of behaviors that are seen as part of the same general notion. Sell that notion of masculinity by all the relevant channels until it is so broadly understood that people can refer to it without stopping for redefinitions.

I don’t want to speculate about how likely that is. I am saying only that it is the way all the other new ideas are sold, so why not? Also, what else is there?

Finally, I notice that more and more I am finding troubles with evaluative scales that have only one active pole. The dynamics are that if there is only one pole and it is good, you get as close to it as you can. If it is bad, you get as far away from it as you can. And all the other values—the existence of which we take for granted when we are talking about normal scales of value—disappear. All the things you lose by getting as close as possible to the good pole or as far as possible from the bad pole simply go out of focus. Or go away. That’s just crazymaking.

Every strategic choice, and this includes linguistic choices, needs to be justified on the grounds that it provides more benefit than harm. That means that the effect on many valued entities needs to be kept in mind. And that means that the kind of unipolar linguistic construction that produced “toxic masculinity” needs to be rejected.

[1] It just occurred to me how jarring it would be to abbreviate it as ™ and even more so to develop an organization named T.M. and to trademark that name as T.M.™
[2] Etymologically, a “virtue” is “a manliness.” The Latin
vir is the source of all such words. That is why it always takes my mind an extra tick or so when I hear or read of a woman “losing her virtue.” I know what is meant, of course, but the etymological shadow cast on her losing her manliness just takes me a little longer to process.
[3] “Femininity” has the same problem, of course. The virtues of gender roles at a time when definitions and preferences are changing so rapidly. Still, I note that no one has bothered to invent a “toxic feminism.”

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It’s not a flaw. It’s a feature

We sang a hymn this past Sunday I had never sung before.[1] I did pretty well in the first stanza but I hit a serious speed bump in the second. It goes like this:

“Teach us, O Lord, your lessons
as in our daily life
we struggle to be human
and search for hope and faith…”

That seems like a odd thing to sing in church, where the state of being human is the problem that is solved by God’s grace. Colloquially, “we’re only human” is a way of dismissing a fault of some sort, so that fault = human and vice versa.

Christian theology begins with our “fallen nature.” It is the first part of the story our faith tells. I’m currently working on a way to represent the book of Romans as a series of arguments Paul is making. The argument about what being human is like starts at 1:18, as soon as the preliminaries are over.

18The retribution of God from heaven is being revealed against the ungodliness and injustice of human beings who in their injustice hold back the truth.

There is a charge, “hold back the truth;” there is a guilty party, “human beings;” and there is a response from God, “retribution.”

This case goes on until 3:21. That’s 65 verses of pretty dense prose.

21God’s saving justice was witnessed by the Law and the Prophets, but now it has been revealed altogether apart from law: 22God’s saving justice given
through faith in Jesus Christ to all who believe.

What a piece of work is man, How noble in reason, how infinite in faculty, In form and moving how express and admirable, In action how like an Angel, In apprehension how like a god, The beauty of the world, The paragon of animals.

There is a solution which addresses the problem Paul has identified. It is “God’s saving justice (“the righteousness of God” in the King James that I grew up with”) then a means, “through faith in Jesus Christ.”

That’s a long argument. It begins very broadly describing the great flaw of human beings (we hold back the truth) and continues on to how God is dealing with this flaw (“saving justice through faith”).

We say this every Sunday at several places in the service. It not just the confession that we all read from our bulletins. It is the explicit teaching of the hymns generally, of the liturgy generally, and of the homilies most of the time.

Given that, it is not an oddity, really, that I was surprised to learn that our great struggle is to be human. This is the classic case of “It’s not a flaw; it’s a feature.”

A New Standard

The idea that being human was a goal rather than a deeply flawed condition probably dates, in western thought, from the Renaissance. The Renaissance didn’t celebrate the provision for the salvation of humankind, as the Church did, but rather it celebrated humankind as such. The Prince of Denmark in Hamlet makes the classic case:

What a piece of work is man, How noble in reason, how infinite in faculty, In form and moving how express and admirable, In action how like an Angel, In apprehension how like a god, The beauty of the world, The paragon of animals.

Hamlet, Act II, Scene 2

God is cast, in this scenario, as part of the applauding audience. For those who achieve true humanity, God can only approve in this model. Again, I don’t object to the model. You can hardly read the classic texts in philosophy and history without taking it for granted.

It is not the way the church has looked at it, however, and I don’t think we should start now.

[1] This in a old mainline Presbyterian church in Portland, Oregon. We are not a hotbed of doctrinal innovation. On the other hand, we don’t always pay attention to what we are saying.

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The Beauty of Pravic Verbs

“Still working?” she said as she passed.

“Do you ever get a break?” he said, fifteen minutes later.

Things like this happen for two reasons. I sit and type next a place where a lot of people walk. This of it as a front porch, except that people walk between the porch, where I am, and the house. And then, they don’t really know what I am doing. And it is hard to tell them. [You see the basic structure of the “porch” in the picture below.]

Ursula LeGuin and I have a favorite book of hers. It is The Dispossessed, in which an unassimilable minority is shipped off to a habitable moon and set up as a separate civilization on the condition that they never come back. The people on the planet Urras are “archists;” the people they sent away to the moon, Anarres, are anarchists. You see the problem. [1]

Because the anarchists were very wise people, they understood that the language they all spoke had the values of archism buried in it, so to begin a culture on a new basis, they would have to invent a new language. Which they did. They called it Pravic.

In Pravic, the same verb means both work and play. The founding linguists wanted a language that would enable them to say that meaningful work was restorative in the same way that playful behavior was restorative. The also invented a noun to refer to meaningless routine work; they called it kleggich.

If English has a verb that meant working/playing, it is the word I would use to tell passersby what I am doing on my “front porch.” As you can see by the picture, the front porch is like a long lobby on the other side of the hall from our apartment. When we first moved in, I referred to it as “an extra living room;” then as a parlor (where one would parlez). But my daughter, Dawne, who lives in New Jersey and knows how front porches are used, said, “That’s not a living room. That’s a front porch.” And so it has been, in our family’s language, ever since.

I write three kinds of things out there on my front porch. I keep up a correspondence with friends; I write a blog; I write materials for one or the other of the three bible studies—two secular, one Christian—I teach. The really odd thing about that combination of working/playing activities is that what I write gravitates back and forth from one medium to another. Some years ago, for example, I wrote a series of posts on the steps that seemed to me to be either named or implied in the “redemption” of an Israelite from slavery. Those four “posts” are now the centerpiece of a course on the history of the idea of redemption that I will be teaching to one of the secular Bible studies this spring. Because I have friends who are interested in that idea, I ship it off to them, counting on them to act as critics and editors—coauthors, really, although I wouldn’t say that to them.

That array of things—the subjects, the settings, the dialog with passersby—are why I really couldn’t settle on working/playing and why I could use a really good Pravic verb, which LeGuin never actually names. Last week, for example I wrote the current installment in a course I am offering at our church—this is the religious course, not either of the two secular ones—on how Matthew handles Mark’s account of the life of Jesus. The image I am pushing (I know it is anachronistic, but it is clear) is that Matthew is sitting at his desk writing his gospel. He is cribbing substantial parts of Mark’s account in the process and he has that account there on the desk.

He adds some things, he subtracts some things, he changes the order of other things, he tidies up the grammar quite a bit. In last week’s session, for instance, we dealt with Mark’s account of the healing of the woman who had “an issue of blood.” In the middle of the crowd, she managed to touch some part of Jesus’ robe and was instantly cured. Jesus stopped on the spot and said, “Who touched me?” In Mark, the disciples treated that as a dumb question. Who would muscle through a Middle Eastern bazaar crowd and ask who had touched him? Matthew has no use at all for that kind of attitude toward Jesus, so he just drops that whole element of the story. The woman comes up; there is no crowd; Jesus asks no dumb questions; the woman is healed. End of story. But note that you have to start with Mark to see that Matthew has dropped anything at all.

We paired that story with a similar one, just a little later in both accounts, in which Jesus healed the demon-possessed child of a gentile woman. Again, Matthew alters the account he gets from Mark, but both accounts have Jesus referring to the woman as a “dog”—not one of the children of the house, who would be Jews. Even thought I knew the story, I prepared myself for the woman to take issue with the ethnic slur. [2]

But that made her the second woman in this session who “had an issue”—think back to the first woman—so I called the essay, “Two women with issues.” And then I tried to get back to work, but I had to stop from time to time because I just couldn’t seem to stop laughing.

At that point, one of my neighbors wandered by and asked, “What are you working on?” And that made me laugh even harder. There’s never a Pravic verb around when you need it.

[1] It is actually two problems. The archists problem is how to get rid of those who will not admit the legitimacy of force by the state. The anarchists problem is to built a functioning culture in which there is not state to enforce cooperation.
[2] In fact, if you don’t know the story, she accepted the slur at face value and presented her issues with the implications Jesus had drawn. The two issues, as I now see them are: a) is there a necessary temporal delay between feeding the children and feeding the dogs and b) does feeding the dogs necessarily take anything from the children? Real issues, thoughtfully (and successfully) presented.

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The Anger of the Bypassed Classes

Some of the links available in Thomas B. Edsall’s column in the New York Times yesterday have moved me to try to envision a broader political landscape for the U. S. I don’t know if this is sophisticated or naive. I know it can’t be both.

I do know that it isn’t very satisfying from a finger-pointing point of view and I take that as a good sign.

I am accustomed to saying that people who harbor unreasonable prejudices against black people in the U. S. are racists and are to be deplored. I don’t want to go away from that as an importnat premise, but today, I don’t want to start there. I want to start here. (You will see this paragraph again at the end of the argument)

Many of the U.S. counties that moved toward Trump in 2016 and 2020 experienced long-run adverse economic conditions that began with the 2000 entry of China into the World Trade Organization, setbacks that continue to plague those regions decades later.


But even before that, there was NAFTA, which hardly needs to be spelled out anymore, but which is the North American Free Trade Agreement. Here is the citation and the conclusion from Edsall’s article.
“In “Local Economic and Political Effects of Trade Deals: Evidence from NAFTA,” Jiwon Choi and Ilyana Kuziemko, both of Princeton, Ebonya Washington of Yale and Gavin Wright of Stanford make the case that the enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1993 played a crucial role in pushing working class whites out of the Democratic Party and into the Republican Party:


“We demonstrate that counties whose 1990 employment depended on industries vulnerable to NAFTA suffered large and persistent employment losses relative to other counties. These losses begin in the mid-1990s and are only modestly offset by transfer programs. While exposed counties historically voted Democratic, in the mid-1990s they turn away from the party of the president (Bill Clinton) who ushered in the agreement and by 2000 vote majority Republican in House elections”.

What do these changes mean? Here are three things they mean. David Autor and his colleagues specifically cite:


“an ideological realignment in trade-exposed local labor markets that commences prior to the divisive 2016 U.S. presidential election.” More specifically, “ trade-impacted commuting zones or districts saw: a) an increasing market share for the Fox News Channel, b) stronger ideological polarization in campaign contributions and c) a relative rise in the likelihood of electing a Republican to Congress.”
So there is the structure of the problem as I am trying it on today. The internationalization of trade (as opposed to protectionism) hit a certain segment of the U. S. population very hard. Autor et. al. call these “trade-impacted…districts.”

It not only reduced their incomes; it reduced their prospects. Thus, according to Katherine Russ et. al.,

“…trade induced economic downturns “affect entire communities, as places with the lowest fractions of high-school or college-educated workers are finding themselves falling with increasing persistence into the set of counties with the highest unemployment rates.”


So here’s where they are:
“Eroded social standing, the loss of quality jobs, falling income and cultural marginalization have turned non-college white Americans into an ideal recruiting pool for Donald Trump — and stimulated the adoption of more authoritarian, anti-immigrant and anti-democratic policies.”

And not only that, but:

“Lea Hartwich, a social psychologist at the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies at Osnabrueck University in Germany wrote in an email:


“Those falling behind face a serious threat to their self-worth and well-being: Not only are the societal markers of personal worth and status becoming unattainable but, according to the dominant cultural narrative of individual responsibility, this is supposedly the result of their own lack of hard work or merit.”

So the “societal markers” of personal worth and status are severely eroded and, even worse, according to the dominant cultural narrative of individual responsibility—which they themselves insist on—all this is their fault.


Finding Scapegoats.


So let’s review. This identifiable group of voters has had a really rough time since and because of the internationalization of trade. They have lost income and status and both those trends appear to be continuing for the foreseeable future. The group that has benefitted from these changes has made alliances with the groups these voters are accustomed to feeling superior to, so our losses are not only absolute, but also comparative losses.


These voters need someone to blame in the very worst way. Changing the issues defining our situation from economic to cultural seems like a good move. That means that the class that is benefitting from these changes and their “projects,” the people we have always thought of as below us, cannot be opposed in economic terms but there are lots of cultural terms available.


The effect of this culture war will be to ridicule the rising class above us, the managerial class, and to deplore the class below us, the even poorer whites, and the darker hued minority groups. Programs like Affirmative Action are perfect for that purpose because they are race-based systems of preference. The Black Lives Matter protests that keep getting out of hand are nearly ideal and, combined with Defund they Police, they are entirely ideal. The schools where these voters send their children are a hotbed of left-wing ideology.


And so on. These are Fox News watchers, if you remember the reference from David Autor and his colleagues, so justifications of these grievances are ready to hand and I have used some of the language here.


What should such a person do?


Here is where I started, you will recall.


“I am accustomed to saying that people who harbor unreasonable prejudices against black people in the U. S. are racists and are to be deplored. I don’t want to leave that as a valued premise, but today, I don’t want to start there. I want to start here.”

I started with changes in international trade and found up with “unreasonable prejudices against black people.” These easily visible prejudices are now seen as the last step in a long line of steps, none of which have been their choice. They can’t change the shift toward international trade and the skills that fit best with it. I can’t—“I” in that sentence is used to refer to the group of people who have been disadvantaged by the shift—acquire those skills myself and even if I could, the number of such jobs being shifted from human beings to robots will continue to grow. The groups below me are receiving unfair help from the groups above me and they are claiming these advantages as their right. The anger I quite naturally feel because I am ridiculed by those above me and reviled by those below me, needs to find an outlet of some sort.

The Republican party is cueing up a list of causes I can legitimately be angry about. They are offering me leadership that supports and frames my grievances as public policies. What have you got to offer me that can compete with that?

Some will say, of course, that I ought not to pursue my own welfare, but the welfare of the country, but that’s not what anyone else is doing. Every group I have named is out for personal benefits, whether moral credit or economic advantage, so I don’t think I ought to be the only one foregoing personal benefits of “the greater social good.”

What else have you got?

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Staying in Love

I am going to argue today that it is possible and that for a certain kind of person—I am that kind of person—it is a really good idea. Now, during what my wife, Bette, and I call “the Valentine season” seems like a good time to try out the argument.

I will argue that it is not easy to stay in love, but first I would like to argue that it is hard to give a clear meaning to the phrase. That being the case, I would like to spend some time on what I do not want to convey by using it.

I don’t mean staying infatuated. I know from experience that the period of infatuation feels absolutely terrific. I know it doesn’t last all that long. I know that trying to get it to last longer than it should will fail and will feel bad. I know that making binding decisions under its influence is short-sighted at best. And I knew all that before I learned that the Latin at the heart of “infatuated,” was fatuus, which means “foolish.”

I don’t mean staying in lust. Nothing against lust. It is a wonderful component in a much more complex and satisfying relationship. It is virtually a language of its own. But it isn’t the whole relationship and when it is treated as if it were, it distorts other parts of the relationship, some of which are a good deal more important over the long haul. My idea of the ideal arc of married lust is that you are consumed by it, then you perform it confidently, then you remember it fondly together.

I don’t mean just “not violating” the real promises on which the relationship is based. I do mean really fulfilling, as opposed to just “not violating,” the promises on which the relationship is based, but that is a much more difficult idea. There are the formal promises, like the ones in the marriage ceremony. I am a fan of those promises [1] but there are other, crucially important but usually unarticulated, promises, which are at the heart. I discover only gradually what those promises were. I may learn how to say what they were before my wife does, but she knew them first. She knew when those promises were being kept and when they were not. For me, “really fulfilling” those promises requires that I know what they are—I know that is not true of everybody—and if she can’t tell me, I need to learn in all the other ways I learn.

And finally, I don’t mean simply doing the things that love requires. Loving anyone—this is much broader than the romantic mode—means wishing him or her well; it means doing what you can to support the hopes or, when necessary, to share the griefs. I came eventually to love my parents that way. I love my brothers that way. I love my kids that way.

When I talk about “staying in love,” I am talking about the kind of feeling that helps me do those things. It is fuel for the relationship; it isn’t the goal of the relationship. But it also feels really good.

Elements of Staying in Love

You might not have noticed, but in the last few paragraphs, some major distinctions were made. Here are two. When I talk about “being in love,” I am talking about emotions, not intentions. When I talk about those feelings as fuel, I distinguish what works as fuel for me from what might work as fuel for someone else.

That means that it is the function that unites the whole category and it is the particulars that have the desired effect on the lovers. And it is the particulars I know most about. Take this picture for instance. This was taken on our first actual date—the one after the introductory coffee at Starbucks. We had seen a movie and were wandering around the mall. I asked if she would mind if I took some pictures. She was fine with that. [2] This is the picture I wanted, but I was having a lot of trouble describing how I wanted her to pose for it. Where are the elbows, where are the hands, etc. She said, “I see what you’re getting at,” and put herself like this. This is exactly what I had in mind, but she got there by imaging what I might have wanted. I still get a lift out of that.

There is a lot of celebration of independence for women these days and very little celebration for marriage. And marriage, a good one anyway, is an interdependence tailored to the personalities of the partners. So she has devised a way to “perform” dependence now and then as a favor. These are the little gestures that used to be thought of as “good manners” and which, after a period of being vilified, [3]are now mostly ignored. We still do them because they still enact the “being in love” part of the relationship and in that way, they fuel all the other parts.

It might well be—I haven’t asked her—that she would prefer to do them herself, but that she offers me the chance to do them “for her” because she knows how it affects me. (I’m talking about seemingly inconsequential things like holding doors and seating her at a table.) If that is true, then pretending that I am doing it for her actually accomplishes doing it for us. The gift of these little performed courtesies is generous, assuming that they are done more for me than for her, and they are smart, too, because they fuel the relationship that is so important to us both.

One final example. Early in our relationship she asked me to read a book called The 5 Love Languages. I didn’t like it much on first glance, but eventually it occurred to me that if I could find out how she “hears” my love for her, I could speak it in the language she hears best. In all candor, I prefer to offer expressions of love in the language I like best. Who wouldn’t? But if these expressions are going to fuel the relationship, they are going to have to be heard and understood, so “what they are for” has to take priority over “the form I like best.”

For reasons that still baffle me, Bette “hears” love in what the book calls “acts of service.” Remember, as you mull this, that my helping her on with her coat is not a service to her. Her receiving it gracefully and with attention is an act of service to me. So what counts as acts of service to her? You wouldn’t believe it. It is things like keeping the table from always being a clutter of books and papers; it is like taking the garbage out; it is things like getting the dishes off the counter and into the dishwasher and then out of the dishwasher and into the cupboards.

It took me a little while, I confess, to get over the idea that doing all these chores were a way of earning expressions of love. I wouldn’t like them at all if I thought of they as buying something. I thought for a little while of old Laban switching brides on Jacob and then extorting another seven years of chores out of him so he could get the one he had actually chosen. That’s not the best part of the Jacob Cycle.

But eventually, it occurred to me that the gift is seeing “what needs to be done” the way Bette sees it. It is, in fact, exactly like her posing for the picture at the mall. She understood the picture I had in my mind and did that even when I couldn’t describe it. All these chores are just my understanding the picture she has in her mind and doing what I can to make it happen.

Am I right about that? Of course. It fuels “being in love” feelings in Bette which act as the fuel for the marriage. The marriage isn’t about the fuel. It’s about the destination (and also the journey, for those of you who are destination-phobic) but the relationship between having enough of the right kind of fuel and actually getting where you are trying to go—that relationship ought to be clear to everyone.

And finally, it is getting clear to me.

[1] My wife, Marilyn, was sick a long time before she died. We went through a lot of difficult things together and every now and then, she would say, “Do you remember that ‘in sickness and in health’ part of the vows? I think this is what they were there for.” She said it with a smile and she was right.
[2] Unlike a much earlier date, who responded to the idea as if I might want to post it on a Lost and Found bulletin board or at the Post Office.
[3] About a man holding a door for a woman, for instance, I remember the title of a paper given at a sociology conference: “The Hand That Holds the Doorknob Rules the World.” Pretty vivid, don’t you think?

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The Stupidity of Intellectuals

I’m going to say a lot of bad things about intellectuals today so I might just as well take the trouble to identify myself as one right up front. I have had a lot of formal education and have spent more time teaching undergraduates than I have spent doing anything else since 1966. If I were going to have to make the case that I have contributed significantly to the academic consideration of some crucial issue or other, I would have to adopt a much higher standard. Also, I would fail to meet it. But the purpose of calling myself an “intellectual” today is just the share the blame implicit in the accusation I am going to make today.

So let’s start here. “Hi. My name is Dale. I’m an intellectual.”

This line of thought began innocently enough when Paul Krugman reported on Florida’s Senate Bill 148, which, as passed out by the committee, forbade the teaching of certain “divisive concepts.” Krugman added some examples, such as specifying the age of certain rocks as older than the best known biblical accounts would allow them to be.

My favorite “divisive concept” is the well-known conflict about whether Bud Lite ought to be drunk because it is less filling or because it tastes great. In the ads that featured this faux conflict, proponents prepare for, and in at least one one ad, engage in, physical conflict against “the other team.” The other team prefers the same beer, but for a different reason. Right.

Making “divisive concepts” illegal and the teaching of them a matter for prosecution is ridiculous. As an intellectual, I cite all the reasons why such an idea cannot really be taken seriously and then I retire, having done “the job.” That’s not stupid, but it is naive. Let me tell you why.

The Florida bill has nothing at all to do with “divisive concepts” like racial guilt or the legacy of exploitation of native peoples. The Florida bill is an attempt to change the subject from race or imperialism—as above—to how to prosecute unpopular ideas. We have apparently come a long was from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ “freedom for the thought we hate” (1929). [1] A concept is used; some people take exception to it. It is (clearly) divisive. Now, in Florida, if this bill becomes law, the curriculum that contained such a concept may be changed and the professor who made use of it may be prosecuted.

The question that is answered by SB 148, therefore, is this: “How can we change the debate from the evidence available to support an idea like CRT, to the political penalties that may be assessed for using it in public?” It an idea put forth by some very savvy people that the conflict should be changed from one they will certainly lose to one they will certainly win.

Consider the possibilities

So Party A and Party B have a conflict. It must be resolved one way or another. What sort of mechanism should be used to resolve it?: Let’s imagine that it should be put up for a vote. That’s one way. It could be decided by a committee I control. That’s a second way. Or, as a third way, we could have a duel. Party A is better at pistols; Party B at swords. What kind of duel should be scheduled? Or, fourth and finally, they could consult the most knowledgeable people available, experts, and see if there is better support for A’s side or B’s.

In every one of these ways of “settling” the conflict, one party or another is advantaged. “The way the conflict is to be settled” and “who will win the conflict” are just two versions of the same question. And now we see why devices like SB 148 are so powerful. They pretend to be about an intellectual issue of some kind, but they are actually about changing the mode of resolution from one kind to another.

Here’s an example from Ursula LeGuin’s The Dispossessed, the best dystopian novel I know. Shevek is the name of the principal character.

A man named Shevet came up to Shevek one night after supper. He was a stocky, handsome follow of 30. “I’m tired of getting mixed up with you,” he said. “Call yourself something else.

The surly aggressiveness would have puzzled Shevek earlier. Now he simply responded in kind. “Change your own name if you don’t like it,” he said.

You’re one of those little profiteers [a socialist slur on capitalists] who go to school to keep his hands clear,” the man said. “I’ve always wanted to knock the shit out of one of you.”

“Don’t call me a profiteer,” Shevek said. But this wasn’t a verbal battle….When he woke up, he was lying on his back on the dark ground between two tents.”

Shevek’s instinct, like mine, was to dispute the accuracy of the derogatory term he had been called. Shevet was, in fact, mistaken about that. Shevek was no profiteer. He was an academic, however (clean hands) and that was what Shevet resented. An argument about what criteria should be used to determine “profiteer-status” and whether they truly applied to Shevek, is the kind of thing Shevek and I would have preferred.

Shevet, however, changed the kind of fight it was and beat Shevek senseless. They saw each other again from time to time, but the statement had been made and Shevet showed no further interest in Shevek at all. He had said what he wanted to say by beating the shit out of Shevek and Shevek had found no response to it at all. [2]

Nothing I have said so far establishes the intellectuals who participate in this charade as stupid. That’s the next step. I have as my model, the dog in the movie Up, who has one goal or another in mind but who can be instantly distracted by the word “Squirrel.” He doesn’t seem to be able to help himself. Possibly the dog is an intellectual.

Intellectuals ought to be able to do better. When an idea—the home field of intellectuals—is proposed, the intellectuals are attracted to it. We want to show that it is internally inconsistent or that it will be readily abused or that it can be shown to be untrue. And we will continue to make that case all the while the issue is being resolved in other ways in other settings. While one school board after another is taken over by candidates who oppose “divisive concepts,” we intellectuals continue to point out the inherent weakness of the idea. While on professor after another is fined or demoted or fired for using “divisive concepts” in class, we intellectuals continue to write journal articles for each other establishing the fundamental flaws in the concept itself.

That’s the part that is stupid.

I don’t think we ought to ignore stupid ideas. We ought to declare them to be wrong (in any of the hundreds of ways ideas can be wrong) and then change our focus to establishing how the conflict will be resolved. If it is going to be resolved by the courts, what will it take to win there? If at the polls, what will it take to win there? If by vigilante action against elected school boards, what will it take to win there? But we should not, under any circumstances, continue to argue the intellectual flaws of an idea that is winning by every other measure.

[1] In all fairness, that ringing phrase was lodged in a minority opinion in the United Sates v. Schwimmer. I didn’t mean to imply that it has ever been more than an aspiration of intellectuals.
[2] Shevek does find, as the character develops, a way to respond. It is not definitional and it is not physical, but it does drive the rest of the plot.

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Avoiding Divisive Concepts in Our Schools

This is so easy to snicker at and dismiss. It is ridiculous on its face. And that is why it is so dangerous. Let’s think about it. And so we will have something concrete to think about, let’s consider Florida’s Senate Bill 148. In Oregon, a bill will ordinarily have a section that says “This bill may be referred to as the _ Act.” Senate Bill 148 doesn’t give us that, which, I have to say, is tempting.

Here is Paul Krugman’s characterization of it.

I use that last word advisedly: There’s a bill advancing in the Florida Senate declaring that an individual “should not be made to feel discomfort, guilt, anguish or any other form of psychological distress on account of his or her race.” That is, the criterion for what can be taught isn’t “Is it true? Is it supported by the scholarly consensus?” but rather “Does it make certain constituencies uncomfortable?”

Paul Krugman, New York Times, January 24, 2022

But the bill does some interesting things that I think are worth examining. One is that it de-professionalizes educators. If the question at issue is not “is this supported by the scholarly consensus?” as Krugman puts it, but “is anyone offended?” then everything is changed. The students know whether they are offended. The parents know whether the student is offended. Professional accuracy is no longer a defense. Legions of “offended parents” go straight to the school board demanding the head of the offending teacher on a pike because he or she has taught a “divisive concept.”


That’s one change. What was once an inquiry by the institution about whether the teachers had maintained professional standards, is now a witch hunt conducted from the outside against a professional. If you think of the educator as part of the knowledge economy—the brain part of the work force—then all the advantages in this conflict go to the aroused parents who may very well not be part of the knowledge economy and may have a grievance against those who are. This is just another skirmish between the managerial part of the work force and the blue collar part of the workforce. It’s a familiar conflict in electoral politics, but this extends it to schools.


Is this really possible? Let’s look at two paragraphs of Senate Bill 148. I have put in bold font the heart of this wordy paragraph.


The bill specifies that subjecting any individual, as a condition of employment, membership, certification, licensing, credentialing, or passing an examination, to training, instruction, or any other required activity that espouses, promotes, advances, inculcates, or compels such individual to believe certain specified divisive concepts constitutes unlawful discrimination.

Is the age of certain rocks a divisive concept such that requiring an individual to “believe” it is unlawful discrimination? As the teacher, do I compel you to believe it when I ask you on a test what the scholarly consensus is about those rocks? When the question of “belief” is taken out of this sentence, it says that any answer is as good as any other. Find one answer to be acceptable and another not is “unlawful discrimination.”


Here is the second paragraph I had in mind from Senate Bill 148


The bill defines individual freedoms based on the fundamental truth that all individuals are equal before the law and have inalienable rights. Accordingly, the bill requires that instruction, instructional materials, and professional development in public schools be consistent with principles of individual freedom.

The previous paragraph appeared to be about curriculum. This one appears to encompass instruction as well. Instruction will be consistent with principles of individual freedom. Individual freedom to what? Am I free, let’s say, to hold that transitive verbs really don’t have to have an object? Against what notions might I appeal on the basis of my individual freedom?

So as I say, within the context of education, it sounds like silliness. But what it really does is to substitute ideological politics for professional consensus when the two conflict. At the best, it turns the schools into a war zone. At the worst, into a slaughterhouse.

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Disapproval Fatigue and Team Names

I grew up in a meat and potatoes house. We had noodles from time to time, but we never had “pasta.” That being the case, the first dozen or so times I saw the word “antipasto, “ I misunderstood it completely. [1] Today’s reflection is going to be a little bit on the sober side. Probably pretty abstract, too. So I thought starting with the pasta might help; unless, of course, you are anti-pasta.

It will come as no surprise to anyone to hear that the United States is in the midst of a culture conflict. That means, for today’s purposes that there are different cultural norms and that the proper pursuit of the implied goals has either broad latitude or virtually none. And that means that people in Culture A are going to be disapproving of the words and actions of the people in Culture B and vice versa. There is a lot of disapproving going on.

Disapproval

I, myself, am not a big fan of being disapproved of. but today’s dilemma isn’t just that. The more it happens the more it hurts and the more resistant to it I get. I am hoping that by this stage, you are getting a little impatient and are waiting for me just to get on with it. I’m almost done.

At the beginning of the process—imagining for the moment that there could be a “beginning”—when someone criticizes me for some view I hold, I look at the view to see if I really hold it or if I should make any changes in the way I express it and so on. But later in the process, the people who are criticizing and the criticisms they are making are so familiar, that I react to them, rather than to the issue. This is the stage I call “disapproval fatigue.” It is analogous to having the same toe stepped on over and over. After a while, it just hurts more.

When I get fatigued, I don’t go back and look at the object of their criticism any more. I either move out of range or I raise the issue with them in a more focused way—essentially justifying the view they are criticizing—or I begin to attack their views. The grounds for their criticisms are weak, I say, or their way of allocating costs and benefits among the related issues is short-sighted, I say, or their criticisms are badly put and need to be refined.

Digging In

At this point in the process, I am anti- a bunch of things. I will pick three, just as illustrations. I am opposed to the racial policies that are being pushed on me. I am opposed to the description of a goal as unmixed good and therefore as justifying all kinds of actions to support it. I am opposed to the “warfare model” of partisan competition, regardless of whether it is being deployed by the other party or not. I promised three; there are three. There are more where those came from.

We are coming now to the point of this painstaking development. At this stage I am anti-this and anti-that and anti-the other thing. But, as Emil De Becque says so ardently in South Pacific, “I know what you are against. What are you for?” The pressure to be “for” something gets very strong.
You want to say, “Of course I am against that and that and that, I am an X. What would you expect?” The value of the name associated with X is crucially important. X is the answer the De Becque’s question: it is what you are for. And what you are for is the reason you are against all these other things.

That X does some valuable work for you. It gives you an answer—one answer—to the critics. There is a downside to that, but at the moment we are considering the value. It is simple and recognizable. And not only that, it gives you membership in an association of sorts. “Ah,” say the other members of this association, “You are one of us.”

Digging in has drawbacks

As you expected. Here are a few from the banquet table of drawbacks. First, it isn’t accurate. Team names—like “Neoliberal” for instance—do have the effect of grouping people together but people wind up under such an abstract banner for a lot of different reasons. So even if you have chosen it as a shelter from the storm, you have to know that it will misrepresent your views, your particular views.

The second is that you can “dig in” on procedural grounds or on substantive grounds. In the examples above, you can criticize an approach as being too radical (proponents will do anything to advance the cause) or as being wrong (the wrong goal is being pursued). I am calling that first one a procedural critique and it matters because the X name you take will be a strategic or a tactical one. You will be expected to argue that the goal should be pursued more broadly or more slowly or with more attention to side effects. X, in this case, will turn out to be translated as “moderate” or “gutless” depending on the kind of friends you have and on how early in the dispute names are called for.

If you argue that the goal itself is wrong, then you will get a goal-related name. “Patriot” and “Traitor” are goal-related names. “Perpetrator” and “Victim” are goal-related names. [2] You see where this is going.

The last lap

I have been so tempted to begin calling myself a conservative. I don’t want to do it because I don’t like my teammates. And it distorts the reasons I hold a lot of the views I do hold. And it leads people to infer, erroneously, that I must hold related views Y and Z, which I do not.

I think I am not yet at the place where I am compelled to choose among the team names. I can keep on doing what I have been doing, which is staying away from some meetings, and reading these books rather than those, and probing carefully to see if I dare have in any setting, the conversation I would like to have. As long as those work well enough and I am not overwhelmed by “disapproval fatigue,” I can keep on doing them. My formal affiliation with some team or other is postponed. I am just me being me.

I may already be, however, at the place when I really should pick a name (and therefore a team) and I might if I could find one that meant what I want it to mean. It would have to have implications for the issues I keep getting involved in (not all of them, of course) or it would not communicate automatically to the other participants what they should expect from me.

I think the recent interest in “anti-racism” is a good example. It offers a scale where “racism” is one pole and “anti-racism” is the other pole. I myself am a non-racist. There is no place on that scale for me. The argument against my position is that there is no way NOT to be on the scale: you are either for racism or against it and being “non-“ is effectively being for it. I disagree. I think that in specifying “race” as the organizing principle, you are guaranteeing an exhausting fight and one which you will lose.

Some fights really are about race. “Race” narrowly construed. But many that are said to be about race are really about either culture or about social class. And of those, some can be more effectively defined and fought if they are about culture or class than if they are about race. So let’s say each of these possibilities is available. We will call these issues “racial;” those issues “cultural;” and those other issues class-based. I think that’s just smart.

So what do you think? Am I a non-racist?

[1] It still doesn’t seem quite fair that ante + pasto migrated over to anti + pasto as if confusing non-Italians were its entire reason for being.
[2] “Marginal” and “marginalized” are goal-related names, too, although you might not think it.

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So…who IS the fairest of us all?

I’ve been in a number of conversations recently that presume race and racism as the proper context for the discussion. It isn’t always. Sometimes it is culture; sometimes it is class; sometimes it is religious practice.

And on some of those occasions, I have said, “You know, race isn’t really the best category to use in exploring this topic.” And sometimes—fairly frequently, actually—the response has been, “No, no. Race is the right thing to talk about!” And if I say that the best topic is one that distinguishes effective childrearing practices from ineffective ones, I have sometimes been called a racist.

That doesn’t affect me as much as the accusers, inevitably friends of mine, think it will because I was brought up in a culture where “sin” was invariably relevant. There was no getting away from it. The most honorable self-control still falls under the scythe of “thought, word, and deed.” [1] So “racist” isn’t quite that moral blow my friends think it ought to be.

I have two ideas I would like to take out for a walk this morning. The first is that, as important as race is, there are other things we need to talk about, too. One way to approach the question—not the question of racism, but the question of talking about racism—is to ask when we will be done. The best answers, I think, vary with the reasons for talking about it. Here are some.

American history: Race has been a huge part of American history. I think it should be part of every school curriculum every year. I think racial guilt should not. And if you think it should, I would like for you to say what good outcome you are trying to achieve by making school children feel awful about things their great-grandmothers did. [2] I can see the teaching that “the savages” ought to be denied human dignity as a wrong teaching. I can see acts of cruelty and theft of property [3] as part of the account of American history. I can see the decisions and acts of particular individuals and groups as deserving the adjective “racist.” But in our schools and in our teaching generally, I think there ought to be a reason for teaching what we teach.

The defense I most often hear is that it ought to be taught because it is true. But that’s an awful answer. It ought not be taught if it isn’t true, but among the zillions of true things, some are relevant to the narrative and some (most) are not. And narratives themselves are not true or false, but rather useful or not. Facts that are alleged in support of the narratives can, of course, be true or false, but the narrative itself cannot.

Social Equity: Let’s start with the idea that the economic and political system we have developed have very positive effects on people who are resource rich [I define that notion broadly enough to include having good parents] and very poor effects on people who are resource poor. As Anatole France puts it, “’The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.”

There are three kinds of reasons commonly given in support of social equity—“equity” remember means “fairness” not necessarily equality. The achievement of social equity will need to have some way to deal with those disadvantages that are principally caused by racial discrimination, but racial equality and social equity aren’t the same kinds of things at all. The first of the reasons is that it—achieving a fair society—is the right thing to do. I think that is important for many kinds of reasons, but it is not, by itself, going to solve the problem.

Another kind of reason is that social equity is cheaper. When a population is treated fairly and believes it is being treated fairly, governing them is not at all expensive. Frances Fukuyama, writing about trust, says that in low trust societies, there is a tax levied on every human transaction. That’s why inegalitarian and authoritarian societies are so expensive. It is a commonplace to say that if we spent more money on schools, we wouldn’t have to spend so much on jails. I have some quibbles about that, mostly having to do with measurement, but the idea that prevention is cheaper than treatment ought to be relatively uncontroversial.

Although you wouldn’t necessarily presume it, it is true that having a small favored population to whom the best of the society flows means that you have to do something to keep those goods and services from the large disfavored population. Keeping the good schools separate from the poor schools and the good neighborhoods separate from the poor ones requires monitoring and enforcement. It requires laws and regulations and inspectors and punitive sanctions and somebody has to pay for all that. In a lot of cases, exclusion just costs more than inclusion.

This is not an argument for inclusion, please remember, on the grounds that it is right. This argument is based on how much less expensive it is.

Third, social equity gives us the kind of society we would genuinely prefer to live in. This argument doesn’t take the route of arguing how best to achieve it, only that it is the common preference. An equitable society is not one where there are no losers; it is one where the losers are where they are because of their choices. [4] Winners and losers are not toxic categories in an equitable society, particularly if it is a snapshot taken today rather than a fate forced in the long run onto whole populations. It is also a help if “being a loser” is not a disaster. A society that helps its losers gives them a chance to not always be losers.

This is really the simplest of the arguments. A society where you can live freely only when the walls are high and the gates are locked is not a good place. A society where you are allowed to go wherever you want provided you are willing to step over the bodies on the sidewalk or fend off the mendicants is not a good place. People would choose something better than that if given the chance.

In the paragraphs above, I have argued that you can say a lot of important things about equity without ever introducing the effects of our racial history. But now I would like to talk about race and especially about racial stereotypes. This isn’t “race” the way biologists look at it. These are the different flavors of “them” that show up in conversations that get out of hand.

I hear that there is increasing concern that “whites” are going to become a minority in this country. That’s where the demographers see the trends to be headed. I think it is worth asking, “minority of what?” Any answer to that will be required to invent the category of “non-whites” and to treat it as if it were a coherent cultural or political entity. You would have to be willing to say things like: this is how nonwhites think, this is how they relate to each other, this is how they vote, and this is why. Those are ridiculous because they require attributing commonalities to a population that actually have in common only that they don’t look like you. That’s not common enough to say sensible things. “Non-white” in this formulation is only another way of saying “them.”

Let’s start at another place and wrap this exploration up. Using “race” as described above, it is reasonable to say that every “race” has characteristics—things they characteristically prefer, things they are normally good at or poor at, patterns of childrearing. “Characteristically,” I said. Now let’s imagine a circle of chairs on a stage. In each chair is a representative of each “race.” The question the moderator asks is this: what characteristic of your “race” are you proudest of?”

There ought to be something to say no matter what group you are representing. It doesn’t sound that hard. But when we get the the white representative—you see now why I started with the fantasy about the majority of minorities—what will the white person say? Whatever it is, it will be called “racist” by nearly all the people I know. Good things about white people are “racism.” End of discussion.

I have three criticisms to make of that sorry state of affairs. The first is that it is silly. The second is that it is patently unfair. The third is that it will not help us get to where we want to be.

There is a lot of talk today about “anti-racism.” That’s my position. I think race should be the focal point when it helps us all move in the direction we want to go. Where there are other concepts that are more helpful, let’s use those.

[1] One of my favorite Whoopi Goldberg lines comes from early in her career. As she relates it, someone said the was a sinner. “No, no, she said, I’m a surfer.” As if she was talking about one pronunciation or another and the accuser’s misunderstanding was completely benign.
[2] Probably it was their great-grandfathers, but I am grandfathering the current gender equity discussion into the old racial guilt discussion
.
[3] Complicated without a common definition of what constitutes “property” but we could have gotten over that if we had really wanted to.
[4] It is not hard to think of exceptions, like people who were born with debilitating mental or physical handicaps. I grant them as exceptions to the general rule and ask that you do that too.

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